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_ _, ."\i:i • .Jur. 2d, >lort-jayes 332, at 399. 22 
PlCi1nti:£.s, M.merican Coin Portfolios, Inc. and 
•.• n0u Co. (hereinafter collectively referred to as 
'--.:.1'-:?ric3n'
1
), thr0ugL attorneys for record, submit this 
I. NATURE OF PROCEEDING; DISPOSITION BELOW; 
AND RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
'.lature of Proceeding. 
This is an action for quiet title and foreclosure of 
certain interests in real property, filed in the Third 
Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County. 
il. Disposition Below. 
American appeals from a Summary Judgment entered in 
favor of Respondents/Plaintiffs and Counterclaim Defendants, 
Ronald and Pamela Jones (hereinafter collectively referred to 
as "Jones"), granting priority to the interest of Jones in 
the Subject Property over the interest of American. The 
Summary Judgment rules on the respective rights of only two 
parties to this multi-party case. The District Court, 
however, directed the entry of a final judgment, finding that 
there was no just reason for delay. Additionally, American 
appPals from that certain order of the honorable Judge Dee 
I April 27, 1982, denying American's Motion for Summary 
J'luqment and finding that the evidence of indebtedness held 
American is not secured by American's Trust Deed on the 
-1-
Subject Property. .;.merica.n ..J.l.so appeal.s tr'.:.im +::.,'..1-:-. _ 1.:..11 
minute entry of the Honoracle Judse Dee da teU D2ct:::1ner __, 
1982, denying American's Motion to Vacate, Amenu or 
Reconsider tne Order of April l 
'--· Relief Sought on A;::peal. 
In this Appeal, American requests that tne Summary 
Judgment and the April 27, 1982 Order be reversed witn 
directions to enter judgment in favor of American oy 
dismissing the Complaint herein as to American and granting 
priority to American's Trust Deed security interest over any 
interest of Jones in the Subject Property, in accordance with 
the Counterclaim of American. In the alternative, American 
requests that the Summary Judgment and the April 2 7' 1982 
Order be vacated, and the case be remanded for further 
proceedings. 
II. MATERIAL FACTS 
A. The DisEuted Security Interests. 
l. This action involves the status and priority of 
a security interest held by American in a 320 acre parcel 0£ 
undeveloped land located in Salt Lake County (the ''Subject 
Property"). In September 1980, defendant L. H. Investment 
owned fee simple title to the Subject Property. L. H. 
Investment entered into a Commodities Purchase Agreement 
dated September 22, 1980 with American, under which American 
-2-
J;2CJlJ, 1 JuU.vC.1 1_0 u. l..-ivestment for the purchase of 
'« .. ties Purcnase Agreement"; R. 201-204 
.tf 1Javit of George Drykerman, Vice-President of 
s2cur? under the Agreement, L. H. 
1vestment executed a Trust Deed (R. 271-73) and a Trust 
]eed on the Subject Property (R. 275-78; hereinafter the 
'Trust Deeu"). Trust Deed in favor of American dated 
September 4, 1980, properly recorded on September 24, 1980, 
recites that it secures "payment of the indebtedness 
evidenced by a promissory note . in the principal sum of 
( R. 275). $200,000.00, 
2. Under the Commodities Purchase Agreement, L. H. 
Investment was obligated to deliver to American on October 
22, 1980 a quantity of gold that $200,000.00 could purchase 
at 90.5% of the London afternoon price on that day. On 
October 20, 1980, L. H. Investment and American entered into 
an Amendment to the Commodities Purchase Agreement (R. 
286-288), whereby L. H. Investment paid American the 
$19,000.00 discount premium, representing the difference 
between the purchase price specified in the original 
Agreement and the London afternoon price on October 22, 1980, 
and L. H. Investment agreed to pay the balance of the 
price ($200,000.00) by delivering to American on 
·luvember 22, 1980 the amount of gold which could be purchased 
-3-
L l'_:·_' 
that date. The October 2U .2...me11Jment reel ':..2s in pd.c _.i'jr..._q--'il 1 
that the Agreement 
the Trust Deed (2. :C87 j. 
indebtedness was repeated ani 
22, 1980. 
3. On December 5, 1980, L. H. Invest;nent executeou 
a warranty deed to the SubJect Property Jones. l'his Jeed 
specifically recites that it is "SubJect to a Deed of Trusc 
in favor of American . . in the principal amount of 
$200,000.00 with interest thereon, recorded September 24, 
1980, (A copy of the warranty deed is attached as 
Exhibit "D" to Jones' Response to Appellants' Motion for 
Summary Disposition in this Court, dated March 21, 1983). 
Jones admitted in the Court below that the SubJect 
was conveyed to him subject to the American Trust Deed (R. 19 
"Affidavit of Ronald Jones"). 
4. On January 22, 1981, American and L. H. 
Investment entered into a Revised Commodities Purchase 
Agreement (R. 293-301) and a revised Trust Deed Note (R. 
290-91). These documents are virtually identical to the 
original Agreement and Note except that they provide that 
"roll over" option is automatic each month if L. H. 
Investment pays the monthly discount premium, and the Trust 
,_c:t lll'J tr.e 113, ,oUG. uU discount premium payment. These 
"'-" docCJments recite the prior dealings of the parties 
Cooncditi2s Purchase and 
are attach2d as £zh1bi-c. to tae ,January 22, 1931 
Commodities Purchase Agreement (R. 303-10). The 
_'.e';1sed Agreement and each specifically recite that they 
continue to be secured by the Trust Deed (R. 290 and 296). 
5. At no time has L. H. Investment ever repaid to 
American the $200,000.00 principal indebtedness, either in 
cash or commodities (R. 203 "Affidavit of George 
Morever, the Revised Agreement recites in 
paragraph 1 that "L. H. Investment shall continue to apply 
the $200,000.00 advanced by American . (R. 294; 
emphasis added) . There has never been any evidence produced, 
in the form of an affidavit or otherwise, purporting to show 
that American has ever received payment of the $200,000.00 
principal indebtedness. 
6. There is no evidence in the record showing that 
after Jones took his warranty deed subject to the American 
Trust Deed, that Jones ever changed his position or in any 
wa1 relied on the Revised Agreement and Note as a payment of 
''' Jebt owed American or an extinguishment of the Trust 
In fact, on February 16, 1981, subsequent to the 
-5-
execution of t:1e 2-.evisecl .1;.greement _<(_,tl_:, ,_,, t.· _, -,_; 
trust deed to the Subject Proper'.::.:/ i.1 :=a1.,,ur 1Jt :3. 1:!111 l ._iL 
(?.. 398-400), and the legal ,Jescr1;_:it1on tl1ere1n 3pc:,ci:Cical: 
American's Trust Deed (2. 
deed was forwarded for recording by their attorney by a 
letter dated February lu, 19Gl (:' .. 397). 
7. The warranty deed from L. H. Investment to 
Jones, while absolute on its face, was a deed given as 
security only. The deed secured the payment to Jones of 
approximately $60,000.00 from L. H. Investment in connection 
with a sale of diamonds by Jones. This security interest 
only is admitted in correspondence from Ronald Jones (R. 
352-53), and his attorney, James Harward (R. 395), and is the 
subject of a separate lawsuit by L. H. Investment against 
Jones in Third District Court, Civil No. C81-1858. In fact, 
Jones executed a warranty deed back to L. H. Investment on 
December 29, 1980 to be placed in escrow, which deed again 
expressly recites the continuation of the American Trust Deed 
(R. 396). As late as May 5, 1981, after American had 
recorded its Notice of Default, Jones' attorney delivered 
written instructions directing the recording of the escrowed 
warranty deed from Jones to L. H. Investment upon L. H. 
Investment's performance of the underlying agreement for 
which Jones originally received a deed as secur1cy (R. 4uc). 
-•_J-
1'';,l, L. Li. Investr:-ient defaulted on 
t-;1•..: :n.deLt(:'dness t-:J ;\merican, and American 
J,,,j «nt:, steps tCJ foreclose the T:-ust Deed (R. 9-13 
ct.ice of T:custee's Sale"). 
i;-. t11e 0elo•...;. 
9. Prior to American's trustee sale, Jones 
,:c,mmenced U11s action against American, Robert Holt as 
trustee, and L. H. Investment to enjoin the 
trustee's sale (R. 2-4). Jones subsequently amended the 
complaint to quiet title to the Subject Property in Jones (R. 
184-94). American counterclaimed and cross-claimed for 
judicial foreclosure of its Trust Deed and a declaration of 
priority of American's interest over all claimants (R. 
118-127). 
10. American added as parties to this action the 
individual guarantors of its Note (Eastman, Calder and 
Boshard, who are also the principals of L. H. Investment) and 
Carl and Mary Barnes, who claim an interest in the Subject 
Property. L. H. Investment, Lee Eastman and Richard Calder 
have appeared in the action, admitted the allegations of the 
counterclaim and cross-claim of American and stipulated to 
·he entry of judgment against them in accordance therewith 
1 R. l'J7-98). Donald Boshard has answered the cross-claim of 
American, denying personal liac1lit·; -ou:. 
the substantive ::i.llegations oi 11\ • .L---::1---:.__, 1 
11. On l-larcn l_'i,-:)2, ;n0ve·.J fur 
pleadings, the admissions of _:..; .. --l.. I:1'1estment :tn11 t:1e 
affidavit of George Drykerman, Vice-President of American IR. 
199-200). Jones submitted a memorandum in opposition to tne 
motion, admitting that tne darranty deed given to Jones was 
expressly subject to the Trust Deed of American (R. LlO). 
12. The Jones memorandum, however, assumed, witnout 
factual support, that all obligations under the original 
Commodities Purchase Agreement and Note had been performed 
and therefore the underlying debt to American was 
extinguished, and argued that the future advances "dragnet" 
clause of the Trust Deed would not secure the ''new" debt 
created in January 1981 by the Revised Agreement and Note (rl. 
212-13). The assumption that the execution of the January 
1981 Revised Agreement and Note constituted performance by 
L. H. Investment and extinguished the underlying indebtedness 
to American was clearly controverted in paragraph 9 of the 
Affidavit of George Drykerman (R. 203) and in the Revised 
Agreement itsel', which also specifically steites tnat it 
remains secured by the Tr Jst Deed ( R. 293-301). The 
underlying principal indebtedness of $200,000.00, to whicJ. 
.:,_,·J suoject, £10.s never been paid to 
.:t::;.r·2, t..tere .-JCJ.S no fu.t.ure advance in January 
C'.ot rely on tl1e "dragnet" clause 
.. The t.::of\. rtmer1can 1 .3 :lotion for Summary 
under advisement (R. 207) and subsequently entered 
l)rder of M.pril 27, 1902, -,-.inich ord2r fii-ids that the 
Jctnuary 22, 1981 Revised Commodities Purcnase Agreement and 
Deed Note "are not secured by the suOJect property." 
IR. 321-22) The form of this order was not served upon 
apposing counsel as required by Rule 2.9(b) of the District 
Rules of Practice, and American's counsel first saw the 
order in connection with Jones Motion for Summary Judgment 
dated June 21, 1982 ( R. 484 "Statement by Jones Counsel"; R. 
348-49 "Affidavit of Robyn Heilbrun"). American moved to 
Vacate, Amend or Reconsider the Order of April 27, 1982, and 
hearing on this motion was held on August 6, 1982. 
14. At the August 6 hearing, the Court apparently 
realized that its prior April 27, 1982 Order was incorrect 
(R. 499-500), and the Court stated that it would "rework it" 
IR. 'i1JO). However, the Court failed to make a ruling or 
prepare an order. Both parties wrote to the Court in 
S1•ptemoer ancl Octooer 1982 requestin9 a ru.Ling on the 
,]''l l,Jfl .. When no ruling was forthcoming, counsel for 
-9-
aiter rece1v1ng perrn1ss1on 
:'ll2 + '_,JI-' I 
denied the tc Vac:J.t2, ,Jr Rccc.ins1ueI: .Jj . ..l ::-1.:.11.._j· 
entry 
..+09). 
15. There was not onl; no factual or legal oasis 
for the court to grant priorit; to the securit; interest oi 
Jones over American 1 s interest in the SuDJect out 
Jones had not even moved for summary Judgment at the time of 
the April 27, 1982 Order. Moreover, the effect of tne 
wording of such order, was not only to grant priority to 
Jones over American, but also to completely divest American 
of any security interest whatsoever in the Subject Property. 
16. After the Court denied American's Motion to 
Vacate the April 27, 1982 Order, American stipulated to the 
entry of Summary Judgment against it, while continuing to 
object to the April 27, 1982 Order and reserving its right to 
appeal to this Court (R. 420-22; 3). Summary Judgment was 
entered pursuant to such stipulation, entering a final order 
and reciting that American does not waive any right to appeal 
( R. 423-26). 
-iU-
J.-=_L. 
'l.. the i1ol,j2r o.f a note secured by a Trust 
'n recd propert:; retain his securit:; interest when the 
l.S .cenc";ed >.Jlt:1 onl/ ::ii.1or 3.rnendrnents thereto, where the 
not 12 incort:or;::.t2s tne T::·Jst Deed, tne principal 
1nJeDtedness evidenced by the note is never paid, and an 
interest in real of an intervening third party 
:s expressly made subJect to the Trust Deed? 
B. Is a debt that is evidenced by a note and an 
agreement, and secured by a Trust Deed on real property, 
extinguished when the note and agreement are amended in part, 
where the principal indebtedness evidenced by the note and 
agreement is never paid? 
C. If the holder of a note secured by a Trust Deed 
on real property accepts a new note as payment for the 
secured note, is the holder subrogated to the rights in the 
Trust Deed as security for the new note, where the position 
of an intervening purchaser or lienor of the real property is 
not made worse after the new note is accepted than it was 
prior to such acceptance? 
D. Where the interest of a grantee in a deed of 
real property is made subject to a prior Trust Deed with the 
knowledge, will the interest of the grantee be 
subordinated to the interest secured by such Trust 
-11-
of the Trust Geed sec'..Jrlt/ IJL:.t t.1e 
secured by 8eeJ :1ever l3 
no '.vorse posit:!...1Jn ::J.i.t2r Ll':.3ul2 3u0cr,Ji11L.lt;...._::::;n. r:e 
originally bar;31ned 
E. Did the District Court commit reversible e>rror 
when deciding on defendant's motion for summary judgment, cy 
ruling that deiendant ha<J no security interest in the SuDJect 
Property, where all parties admitted the validity of the 
original Trust Deed, Note and Agreement in favor of 
defendant, plaintiff admitted that its intervening warranty 
deed was expressly made subJect to defendant's original Trust 
Deed, the trustor of the Trust Deed admitted that the Revised 
Note and Agreement were secured by the original Trust Deed, 
which Revised Note and Agreement on their face state that 
they are secured by the original Trust Deed, and the 
defendant supplied a sworn affidavit that the underlying 
indebtedness had never been paid? 
-L2-
l'J. 
accepteJ tne assumptions 
lLJtDents 3et in tne Jones :'lemorandum in Opposition 
r1c:,n'3 :Cor Summar:/ Juagment (1'. 208-220). The 
,1,_::.mor::.:.n.uuf:l iSSUr.lt=·-.:. t.1at L. d. Investment 11 fully performed'' 
n;der tne original Commodities Purcnase Agreement and Trust 
Note and thereby extinguished tne underlying debt, 
nthout suppl11n9 an1 aftidavit or oti1er testimony to tnat 
,.;,ffect. The Memorandum then argued that since the prior debt 
extinguished, tne January 22, 1981 Revised Agreement and 
Uote constituted a "future advance" and was not covered by 
the Trust Deed's "dragnet clause". Therefore, Jones argued 
that even though his Deed was expressly subject to the Trust 
Deed, the Trust Deed did not secure the "new" indebtedness to 
American. 
The initial assumption that a new debt was created 
in January 1981 was directly contradicted by the only 
evidence before the Court, and therefore the Summary Judgment 
finding that the Revised Agreement and 0ote are not secured 
by the Trust Deed was manifest error. 
A. Neither the Indebtedness Owed to American Nor Its 
Interest Was Extinguished by tne January 22, 1981 
Note and Agreement. 
When a note is given in renewal of another note, it 
-l.3-
debt. i·1arking Syst'2mS, Inc. 'J. lntt:;'r'.ves:=. L. l J..,it -'-'l_l:'.., 
P.2d 176, 173 (Utah 1077); see lJt0n L\.JIJe r\nnotatc11 
§ 70A-3-802. 
controlling law on the present facts. In 1970, 
Proudfi t executed a rene'.val note in ti1e araount of $03, 000 :rnd 
a trust deed securing the note, which trust deed recited that 
it was to secure the note "and any extensions and/or renewals 
or modifications thereof." Id. at 123-24. Remington 
obtained and recorded a judgment lien against the propert1 in 
December 1971. In June 1972, Proudfit executed a renewal of 
the note in the amount of $68,180.00, secured by the prior 
trust deed. This Court found "little merit" in Remington's 
argument that when Proudfit executed the 1972 note, the 1970 
trust deed note for a lesser amount was paid and a new 
separate contract came into being. Id. at 124. The court 
quoted the law as follows: 
Nor does the giving of a new note in renewal 
of another note extinguish the debt for 
which the original note was given unless it 
clearly appears that it was the intention of 
the parties that the execution of the new 
note and the cancellation of the old note 
should extinguish the debt represented by 
the old note. 
-1-+-
--
lr.:corstcdt'2 Trust v. :ieaclund, 51 
dJ, :tj (l',L.;1); accuru, Gray v. Kappos 90 Utah 
i r+- __.3.llj i,}2nt i.:::::il tD ::.;icse in ProuJfit. L. E. 
executed and recorded a Trust Deed for the benefit of 
-,mericein, '.vh1ct1 recites that it secures '1 payment of the 
indebtedness evidenced by a promissory note . . in the 
principal sum of $200,000.00 . . with interest . . and 
extensions and/or renewals or modifications thereof . 
" ( R. 27 5). In Proudfit the second renewal note was for an 
increased debt amount. In the present case the January 22, 
1981 Revised Agreement and Note, merely included the normal 
$19,000 discount premium as part of the renewal Note, and 
each document recites that "L. H. Investment shall continue 
to apply the $200,000.00 advanced by American" and that each 
continues to be secured by the Trust Deed (R. 290 and 
n3-96 l. American provided an affidavit that the 
indebtedness had never been paid, and L. H. Investment, the 
grantor for both parties herein, stipulated to the entry of 
Judgment in favor of American (R. 197-98). 
Finally, the Court held in Proudfit that the taking 
d rcenewal note does not extinguish the debt unless such 
appears as the intent of the parties. Id. at 124. 
-15-
The int en t of t e _:::i a. r :_ l c s t v c , , c 1J r .:. r ,_ r u ..3 t.. 
controllins in 2rouJfit +:::e .. , .. 'i 
I'.l. ti:c i:·::;t-.lrit c::isr:?, 
not only are ti1e ;...,.9r2er:1ent Lir'..J 
no extinc;uishr.;ent \-Jas intended, but the gr an tor for co th 
American and Janes has stipulated to a judgment in of 
American on the validity of the security interest, and is 
suing Jones in a separate action to declare the Jones 
warranty deed void. 
The only fact distinguishing Proudf it is that in 
Proudfit the intervening lienholder did not take his lien 
expressly subject to First Security's trust deed and yet the 
court ruled that First Security's renewal note remained 
secured by the prior trust deed. In the present case, Jones 
took his interest subject to American's Trust Deed and thus 
it is even more clear than American's trust deed retains 
priority. 
The rule in Proudfit and Gray v. Kappas, supra, is 
supported by numerous cases from other jurisdictions. Easton 
v. Ash, 116 P.2d 433, 437 (Cal. 1941) ("The renewal agreement 
was sufficient not only to revive the ind2btedness but to 
renew the original mortgage as well."); './aynesboro Ciat. 2ank 
v. Smith, 145 S.E. 302, 305-06 (Va. 1928). 
-1 -
i ,_::,1 • .L 1 -3l_.1 J, court 1Nas confronted with facts almost 
1 ical to t'.1cs2 l1ere. The plaintiff purchased property 
:ourt reJected plaintiff's claim that the substituted renewal 
the "::o change in the form of the 
eviJonce, or the mode or time of payment--nothing short of 
payment of the debt, or an express release--will 
operate to discharge the mortgage." Id. at 921 (emphasis 
3JJed); accord, Smith v. Thomas, 245 P. 399, 401 (Idaho 1926). 
Jones admits that American's Trust Deed secured not 
only the original September 1980 Commodities Purchase 
Agreement and Note, but also the October 1980 Amendment to 
the Commodities Purchase Agreement, which merely "rolled 
over" the indebtedness for one month by the payment of 
$19,000.00. Jones also admits that the "roll over" on 
tlovember 22, 1980, which made the debt due on December 22, 
1980, was still secured by the Trust Deed. (R. 512-514 and 
519) . However, Jones attempts to argue that the underlying 
inJebtedness and security was extinguished by execution of 
'he Revised Note and Agreement, which documents merely made 
''"c "1ull over" automatic. This argument places form over 
::J tibs tance. The parties to the Trust Deed only formalized an 
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arrangement that Jones admits was ?rior tn •he 
formalization. T11e undisputed fact is tl1at 
never repaid its original advance. 
Constitute a ?uture A2vance. 
In the Court below, Jones assumed that the 
indebtedness of L. H. Investment to American was 
extinguished, and thus argued that the January 22, 1981 
Revised Agreement and Note constituted a "future advance". 
Jones then cited cases to support the proposition t
0
hat the 
"dragnet clause" of the Trust Deed would not secure a future 
advance. The future advance argument is a red herring and 
the cited cases are irrelevant. 
As noted above, L. H. Investment stipulated to the 
entry of judgment in favor of American on its claim that the 
$200,000.00 had not been paid, and American filed an 
affidavit stating that "the indebtedness represented by the 
original Trust Deed Note has not been satisfied or 
discharged" (R. 203). At a minimum, this raised a question 
of fact as to whether the original debt was extinguished and 
precluded a summary judgment finding in favor of Jones. 
Moreover, as noted in Section IV A above, extin9uishment of a 
debt by giving a renewal note can only be established by 
showing the "clear" intent of the parties. The only evidence 
-1'--' 
t11e ...::Jr1.t1nuat1on of the security interest. 
the .1as not the January 22, 
Agreement could not constitute a 
..._ 1rr.:: a.ll'Jar.ce" a.s 1:-:i.s.::;e:-t2d. by Jones .. 
1-:0.,vever, 2'Jen i:E t:1e future advance argument were 
applicable, the Utah cases provide that whether a dragnet 
:lause in a Trust Deed caver future advances is a 
question of the intent of the parties and whether the new 
obligation states that it is to be secured by the prior Trust 
Deed. First Security Bank of Utah v. Shiew, 609 P.2d 952, 
955-56 (Utah 1980); Health Teena Corp. v. Zions First 
Bank, 609 P.2d 1334 (Utah 1980); see North Park Bank 
of Commerce v. Nichols, 645 P.2d 620, 621-22 (Utah 1982). 
In the present case, both the Revised Note and 
Agreement specifically state that they are to be secured by 
the Trust Deed, the affidavit of George Drykerman states that 
the Revised Agreement and Note were to be secured by the 
Trust Deed, and the Stipulation to the Entry of Judgment in 
fa,1or of i\merican by L. B. Investment evidences this intent. 
This was the only evidence before the Court as to the intent 
of the Parties. 
The Security Interest of American Is Prior to Any 
• 1terest of Jones Under the Doctrine of Equitable Subrogation. 
Assuming, arguendo, that American lost the legal 
:,r1,nity of its Trust Deed by executing the January 1981 
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Revised Agreemen-c anLl Amer1_:311 st1J..1 Jh.lS :::·;."1:::_..;.u.L-.: 
priority in tl1e SUCJeCt Pr::if:Jert/ over tne interest ul.: 
under the doctrine of equitable suorogati0n. -J. ..L:2nuc:r 
such lender will secur1tj pos1t1on oi tne Lier1 
holder whose lien is paid off, ti1e lenJer will be ec,u1taoly 
subrogatad to the security position of the original lien 
holder. Hartin v. nicKenlooper, 00 Utah 150, 59 P.2d 1139, 
1152 ( 1936); George v. Butler, 16 Utan 111, 50 P. 1032, 1034 
(1897). 
The principle of equitable subrogation was appliea 
in the case of Tracy-Collins Trust Co. v. Goeltz, 5 Utah 2d 
350, 301 P.2d 1086 (1956). In Tracy-Collins the plaintiff 
took a new mortgage and made a new loan, the proceeds of 
which paid a prior mortgage. The court quoted the applicable 
law: 
[I]t is not necessary that there snould be 
an express agreement that the prior lien 
shall be kept alive for the benefit of one 
advancing money to pay it, or that it be 
assigned, but if . it was the intention 
of the parties that the person making the 
advance was to have security of equal 
dignity and position with that discharged 
then equity will so decree. 
Id. at 1090 (quoting Jackson Trust Co. v. Gilkinson, 105 d.J. 
Eq. 116, 147 A. 113). 
-zu-
, -'.l j_J.._ J,_,r12s .:irgul:l.ent is accepted thz.i-c. Revised 
,_;Ot.t: [JO.lJ tne prior indeDteuness, American did 
.,1 t:_1 t:.1';: 2:<.pr2ss understanding that it would take the 
Ce ed. 
"m1ch .;ecured the deot "paid" by American. 
At oral argument, the court below recognized this 
legal position: 
THE COURT: Ti1e subrogee would be tne second 
holder subrogated to the first holder 
because of the equities involved. The 
equities would involve the second holder 
assumes [sic] the role of the first holder 
and gets that equitable consideration--
equitable position regardless of whether the 
note was extinguished. 
MS. HEILBRUN: Right. He who paid off the 
note. In other words American paid off the 
prior note. American believed itself to be 
retaining that position. American would be 
equitably subrogated to the position of the 
holder of the prior note. 
MR. COURT: Uh-huh. Yeah. 
(R. 4'!9-SOO). The Court, however, did not address this issue 
in the belated minute entry summarily denying American's 
Motion to Vacate, Reconsider or Amend the April 27, 1982 
:rder. 
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D. The Security 
Interest of Jones Unuer t;1'2 ,_,._ 
Subordination and 
Deed for the January 1921 Revised A0reemet1t anu 
American still has a prior int2rest i11 SuoJcct 
over the interest of Jones unc..ier t}:e aoc::.r1..-10.s ui 2<-iUltuG.lf-::' 
subordination and equitable mortgage. wh1cn, 
because of some defect, is only operative to transfer an 
interest in equity to the mortgagee, is effective not only 
against the parties thereto, but also against others who 
secure their interests with knowledge of the rights of tne 
mortgagee. 55 Arn. Jur. 2d, Mortgages ..l32, at 399. 
In Redemptorist Fathers of the State of Washington 
v. Purdy, 24 P.2d 1089 (Wash. 1933), the court set forth the 
elements of an equitable mortgage: 
The essence of an equitaole mortgage is tne 
intent of the parties to create a lien on 
the property described to secure the 
principal obligation. If the intent is 
present, equity will establisn the lien, not 
only between parties, but against 
purchasers or incumorancers w1tr1 r1utice. 
Id. at 1090; accord, Reidy v. Collins, 2b P.2J 712, 714 
(Dist. Ct. Cal. 1933); see Owens v. Conti11ental Supply Co., 
71 F.2d 862, 86.5 \LUtn Cir. l;15..f;. 
,_·::r:. ',::,J.se, int'2nt that the January 
--.ljt and L1ote be secured by the Trust Deed 
i::ci(::JU(..JLS :::·n r_;L'2 of eaci1 Jocurnent. Jones not only 
'. _ 1.1..':..-: the DeeC1, he tcok the deed 
Jones 
a trGst Jeed to a third party subsequent to the 
J3r1uJry AgreeQent and and in such document 
th2t it 1-1as subJect to ;"1.merican's Trust Deed. Nor 
hd Jones ever change his position in reliance on any 
ext1nguishment of American's debt in January 1981. 
Thus, Jones' notice of the equitable mortgage was 
express 1 y present and continuing, and Jones' interest in the 
Subject Property should be suborindated to American's 
security interest. 
• - 'T • -
'-u, 1L..._,1._., 2J L• 
the January 1961 
and therefore did :-:ot ext1nsu1sh the (.leLt 
by the American Trust Deed: (1) The Revised Agreement and 
Note mer el:; "rolled over" the originill indebtedness; ( 2) Tc1e 
Revised Agreement and Note expressly recite that they 
continue to be secured by the Trust Deed; (3) American has 
never been paid any portion of the original $200,000.00 
advance which was secured by the Trust Deed; (4) Jones 
warranty deed was made expressly subject to the American 
Trust Deed; and (5) at the time the Jones warranty deed was 
executed, the American indebtedness had already been "rollecl 
over" for two consecutive months. 
Since the underlying indebtedness to American was 
never extinguished, there is no issue in this lawsuit of 
whether a "future advance" of moneys is covered by the 
"dragnet clause" in the Trust Deed. There was no future 
advance because the original debt was never paid. 
Moreover, even if the execution of the Revised 
Agreement and Note could be construed as a payment of the 
prior indebtedness, American is equitably subrogated to the 
Trust Deed security for the prior obligation because the 
-2..f-
suL]ect to the American Trust Deed. He 
,1 fi oe pi<rcl1aser '>'llt;--iout notice and he did not 
In fact, Jones su0sequently executed a Trust Deed 
to a thirJ party recitiny that it was subject to the prior 
Deed. E·1en if a defect in American 1 s security 
instruments exists, the interest of Jones is equitably 
subordinated to the rights of American. 
American's Trust Deed on the Subject Property is 
both legally and equitably prior and superior to any interest 
of Jones. On the undisputed facts, Summary Judgment should 
have been entered in favor of American. But in any event, 
there was no basis for the Court below to find, in a Summary 
Judgment context, that American's Revised Agreement and Note 
were not secured by the Subject Property. 
American requests that this Court reverse the 
Summary Judgment and the findings of the April 27, 1982 
with directions to enter judgment in favor of 
or in the alternative, vacate the Judgment and 
Urdcor c:rnd remand this case for further proceedings. 
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